

July 53

SECURITY INFORMATION

Outline: Current Communist Position on a Korean Armistice

I. General

- A. Communist acceptance of the 8 June 1953 agreement on POW's represented important modification of previous position on non-forcible repatriation.
- B. Reflects genuine Communist desire for truce.

II. Reasons Communists desire truce

- A. We cannot estimate with certainty considerations motivating Communists for truce
- B. Reasons found in new Soviet regime's assessment of internal and external situation of the Communist Bloc.

1. Internal

- a) Difficulties in simultaneously supporting Korean war and
 - 1) offsetting increased Western strength outside Far East.
 - 2) meeting Chinese Communist military and economic demands.
 - 3) assisting Communist China industrialization

2. External

- a) Danger Korean war might expand in unwanted fashion.
- b) Truce necessary part of world-wide program conciliatory tactics to reduce East-West tensions.
- c) Would undermine current Western rearmament program.

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- d) Develop climate in which latent Western differences would expand.
- e) Postarmistice political conference provide opportunity for splitting US from its major allies and discredit West in Asia.

III. Communist reaction to Rhee's release of anti-Communist POW's.

- A. Rapid progress toward conclusion of truce when Rhee suddenly released 27,000 Korean POW's on 18 June.
- B. Communists took position in 19 June letter of willingness to conclude truce with or without Rhee.
- C. Provided, however, UN would assure implementation of truce.
- D. This probably represents genuine Command position.

IV. Kind of truce preferred by Communists remains in doubt.

- A. Communist insistence on implementation does not clarify whether they desire peaceful implementation.
- B. Communists rejected Clark's proposal for immediate signing armistice agreement with promise of UN efforts to obtain South Korean cooperation.
 - 1. Communists probably believed they were asked to relinquish major bargaining point prior to determination of Rhee's position.

V. Communists marking time, awaiting results of Rhee-Robertson talks.

- A. Communists aware talks aimed to prevent split between UN Command and South Korea.
- B. Success of talks cannot be predicted by US or the Communists at this time.
- C. Communists refraining from committing themselves until they know whether UN Command and Rhee are to be unified in truce policies.

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- VI. Possibly Communists prefer truce unacceptable to Rhee that would be physically opposed by South Korean forces.
- A. Assumes Communists willing to risk expansion of hostilities.
 - B. Communists may hope for break down of Robertson-Rhee talks. If so,
 - 1. Communists would expect Rhee to put additional pressure on US to meet demands
 - 2. Probably await incendiary action by Rhee:
 - a) release additional prisoners
 - b) seizure of UN supplies and equipment
 - c) inciting violence against UN personnel
 - d) withdrawal of South Korean troops from UN Command
 - e) independent military action against North Korea.
 - 3. Communist propaganda would reiterate Communist desire for truce.
 - 4. Communists probably would await UN response to Rhee's action
 - a) Communists probably desire to determine whether United States intended to:
 - 1) Continue efforts to repair breach
 - 2) conclude truce despite South Korean opposition
 - 3) withdraw from Korea
 - 5. If US tried to get Rhee under control, Communists would wait. If accord reached, Communists would demand recovery of released prisoners.

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6. If UN again offered Communists truce after break down of Rhee-Robertson talks, Communists would probably accept it and await US - South Korean conflict.
7. If UN began to withdraw from Korea, Communists would probably permit it.

VII. Believe more likely that Communists want effective armistice and are waiting for UN assurances.

- A. If such assurances provided, Communists would probably not press for recovery of all released prisoners.
- B. Communists are aware that Rhee objects to many provisions of draft armistice.
 1. Communists would reject any proposal that Chinese forces withdraw prior to political conference.
 2. Communists would also reject proposal for early cut-off date on political conference. Many questions which they want to discuss.
 3. Conclusion of US - South Korea security pact not necessarily barrier to truce. If Communists regarded pact as implying US support of South Korean drive to north, however, they would probably demand assurances that US would not support Rhee in violating an armistice.